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UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 
Eu v. San Francisco County 
Democratic Central Committee, 
_U.S._, 89 D.A.R. 2187, 
No. 87-1269 (Feb. 22, 1988). 
Court Voids California Law Prohibiting 
Party Endorsements in Primaries 
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimous-
ly struck down a California law that 
prohibited party endorsements in pri-
maries as a violation of the First Amend-
ment. The Court also stuck several laws 
governing the composition of parties' 
governing bodies, and regulating party 
chairs. 
The suit was brought by members of 
all major political parties in California, 
various county central committees, and 
other political partisans. The suit chal-
lenged, inter alia, Elections Code sec-
tion 11702, which barred central commit-
tee endorsements in primaries; Elections 
Code section 29430, which made it a 
misdemeanor for any candidate to claim 
party endorsement in a primary; and 
various provisions regulating parties' in-
ternal affairs by setting the numbers, 
terms, selection, and removal of party 
officials, terms of chairs of central com-
mittee chairs, and requiring that the 
chair alternate between citizens of north-
ern and southern California. A challenge 
to a state ban on party endorsements in 
nonpartisan elections is being litigated 
separately. See Unger v. Superior Court, 
37 Cal. 3d 612 (1984), and Geary v. 
Renne, No. C-87-4724 (N.D. Cal.), 
stayed, 856 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1988). 
The trial court granted summary judg-
ment on all issues, holding that the stat-
utes impermissibly violated First and 
Fourteenth Amendments rights to free-
dom of speech and free assembly. The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme 
Court vacated the decision and remanded 
in light of a recent decision. The Ninth 
Circuit again affirmed. 
The Supreme Court, per Justice Mar-
shall, joined by all other justices except 
Justice Stevens, who concurred, and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who took no 
part, affirmed. The Court held that the 
proffered reasons for the various stat-
utes, all of which essentially stemmed 
from concerns over the statute's purport-
ed interest in preventing intraparty fac-
tionalism and infighting, were not suf-
ficiently compelling to justify the clear 
infringements on speech and association. 
The Court raised, considered, and reject-
ed these concerns for each statute. At 
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bottom, the Court held that although a 
state is free to regulate the conduct of 
its elections to ensure that they are free 
of taint and are orderly, that interest 
does not extend into the internal work-
ings of political parties. To justify the 
intrusions here, the state must meet an 
exacting test: it must show a "compelling 
governmental purpose", with a remedy 
"narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 
Justice Stevens wrote separately to ex-
press his discomfort with the formula-
tion of that test, although he concurred 
in the result. 
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 
_U.S._, 89 D.A.R. 2083, 
No. 87-1485 (Feb. 21, 1989). 
Court Permits Attorneys' Fees 
in Excess of Contingent Fee 
Agreement in Civil Rights Case 
The U.S. Supreme Court has unani-
mously held that in a civil rights case 
the plaintiff is not limited to an attor-
neys' fee equal to what the attorney 
could have received under the contingent 
fee agreement between the attorney and 
plaintiff. 
The plaintiff brought suit in federal 
court for the Western District of Louisi-
ana under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleg-
ing excessive force by a local sheriff. 
After trial by jury, the plaintiff was 
awarded $5,000 in compensatory dam-
ages and a like amount in punitive dam-
ages. He sought $40,000 in attorneys' 
fees and costs under section 1988. The 
trial court awarded $7,500 in fees, and 
$886.92 in costs. On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit reduced the award, feeling bound 
by an earlier decision that a contingent 
fee agreement serves to cap the amount 
that may be awarded. The fee agreement 
here was for a standard 40% of the 
award. The Fifth Circuit reduced the 
award to $4,000. Other circuits have a 
contrary role, and do not cap attorneys' 
fee awards according to contingent con-
tracts. 
The Supreme Court, per Justice 
White, joined by all justices except Jus-
tice Scalia, who concurred in part and 
concurred in the judgment, held that "a 
contingent fee contract does not impose 
an absolute ceiling on an award of attor-
neys' fees and to hold otherwise would 
be inconsistent with the statute and its 
policy and purpose." The basis for a fee 
award is whatever is a reasonable fee, 
and although the attorneys' fee agree-
ment is one factor, it is not dispositive 
or binding on the court. Just as an 
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agreement might require too large an 
award to be reasonable, so too it might 
be inadequate to assure an award suf-
ficient to compensate the attorney and 
attract counsel to civil rights cases. This 
is particularly true in civil rights cases, 
where the rights and remedies are frequent-
ly nonpecuniary in nature, and a fee 
fixed as a percentage of such nonpecuni-
ary rights would often be inadequate. 
Texas State Teachers Association 
v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 
_U.S._, 89 D.A.R. 4012, 
No. 87-1759 (Mar. 28, 1989). 
Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees 
Under Civil Rights Statute Not Limited 
to Cases Where Plaintiff Prevails 
on "Central Issue" 
The U.S. Supreme Court has unani-
mously held that a civil rights plaintiff 
need not prevail on the "central issue" 
or achieve the "primary relier' sought in 
order to be the prevailing party eligible 
for an award of attorneys' fees under 42 
U.S.C. section 1988. 
Plaintiff teachers union filed suit in 
I 981 to challenge the school district's 
ban on communications among and with 
teachers regarding employee organization 
during the school day. In particular, the 
union challenged the district's regulation 
prohibiting representatives of the union 
from the school during the day, and 
banning use of the school mail or other 
internal communications for such organi-
zations. Meetings between the teachers 
and organizations were permitted at the 
school during non-school hours, but only 
with the approval of the principal. 
The trial court granted defendants' 
motions for summary judgment on all 
grounds, except for the challenge to the 
requirement of principal permission to 
meet after school hours, which the court 
called "trivial", as the regulation had 
never been enforced. On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed and reversed. It agreed 
that there was no constitutional violation 
in banning union representatives from 
school grounds during the school day, 
under the Supreme Court's earlier de-
cision in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry 
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 
( 1983). The appellate court reversed, 
however, on the issue of the bans on 
teacher-to-teacher communications re-
garding union activities, specifically 
holding unconstitutional the prohibition 
on teacher communication or use of the 
internal mail system. That judgment was 
summarily affirmed by the U.S. Supreme 
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Court. 479 U.S. 801 (1987). 
The union then applied for attorneys' 
fees under section I 988. Both the trial 
and appellate courts rejected the request, 
holding that the union was not the pre-
vailing party as interpreted in the Fifth 
Circuit. That circuit required that a party 
prevail on the "central issue" in the suit 
in order to be awarded fees as the pre-
vailing party. Here, both courts held 
that the central issue was gaining access 
to school facilities and personnel during 
school hours, and the union lost on this 
point, despite obtaining success on "sig-
nificant secondary issues." 
The Supreme Court, per Justice 
O'Connor for a unanimous Court, re-
versed. The Court held that so long as 
the plaintiff succeeds on "any significant 
issue in litigation which achieves some 
of the benefit the parties sought in bring-
ing the suit, the plaintiff has crossed the 
threshold to a fee award of some kind." 
Any other standard, the Court held, 
would be inconsistent with its earlier 
decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424 (1983), which held that a party 
need not prevail on every issue raised in 
order to be entitled to fees under section 
I 988. At minimum, the Court held, "to 
be considered a prevailing party within 
the meaning of section 1988 the plaintiff 
must be able to point to a resolution of 
the dispute which changes the legal re-
lationship between itself and the de-
fendant." 
U.S. Department of Justice, et al., 
v. Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, et al., 
_U.S.___, 89 D.A.R. 3715, 
No. 87-1379(Mar. 22, 1989). 
Criminal Record "Rap Sheet" 
Not Accessible Under 
Freedom of Information Act 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
the public has no right of access to the 
FBI's criminal history files under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 
The FBI collects and maintains crim-
inal record histories on millions of per-
sons, using information compiled from 
various local, state, and federal law en-
forcement agencies. The FBI refused a 
request by a CBS news correspondent 
and the Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press to release these crimin-
al "rap sheets" on four reputed Mafia 
members. Respondents then filed suit in 
federal court under the FOIA, seeking 
the record of one Charles Medico, inso-
far as it contained "matters of public 
record." The parties filed cross-motions 
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for summary judgment. The district court 
granted the Department of Justice's mo-
tion, finding that the information re-
quested was protected under three separ-
ate exemptions of the FOIA. The U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia reversed. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice 
Stevens (joined by Justices Rehnquist, 
White, Marshall, O'Connor, Scalia, and 
Kennedy, with a concurrence on this 
issue by Justices Blackmun and Bren-
nan), reversed, holding that (I) the dis-
closure of such information to a third 
party is prohibited by Exemption 7(C) 
of the FOIA, because it "could reason-
ably be expected to constitute an un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy"; 
and (2) in circumstances where Exemp-
tion 7(C) is facially applicable, the FOIA 
gives public access to government agency 
records only if the information has a 
bearing on the agency's own perform-
ance; that is, if it "is likely to contribute 
significantly to public understanding of 
the operations or activities of the gov-
ernment...." 5 U.S.C. section 552(a)(4) 
(A)(iii). 
Justices Blackmun and Brennan, con-
curring in the judgment, objected to the 
majority's "categorical balancing" of the 
interests under Exemption (7)(C). 
CALIFORNIA 
COURTS OF APPEAL 
Consumers Union v. 
Fisher Development, 
_Cal. App. 3d___, 89 D.A.R. 4108, 
No. A035787 (1st Dist., Mar. 28, 1989). 
Consumer Group Has Standing 
To Enforce Unfair Business 
Practices Act 
The First District Court of Appeal 
has held that a consumer group may sue 
under the Unfair Business Practices Act, 
Business and Profession Code section 
17200, to enforce provisions of the Un-
ruh Antidiscrimination Act, Civil Code 
section 51 et seq. 
Consumers Union is a membership 
group and the publisher of Consumer 
Reports magazine. The group filed suit 
against a housing developer, challenging 
that an exclusive development did not 
meet the standards to be a senior citizen 
enclave, and so the developer was dis-
criminating on the basis of age and 
against families with children. Plaintiffs 
did not have standing under the opera-
tive statute in the Unruh Act, Civil Code 
section 51, 51.2, 51.3, and 52, as the 
group was not an "aggrieved party" as 
that term is defined in the statutes. How-
ever, the group filed under the Unfair 
Business Practices Act, Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 17200, which gen-
erally provides a cause of action to "any 
person" to enjoin any business practice 
that is in violation of any law. Defend-
ants demurred on the ground that the 
group lacked standing under the Unruh 
Act and could not "bootstrap" standing 
through the Business and Professions 
Code. The trial court agreed and sustain-
ed the demurrer. 
The First District, per Justices Barry-
Deal, Merrill, and White, reversed. The 
court noted that section 17200 has con-
sistently been held to confer the broadest 
standing to any person to enforce its 
provisions, and that the Act generally 
prohibits any business practice that is 
unfair, including any practice in viola-
tion of any other law. 
City of Sacramento v. Drew, 
_Cal. App. 3d___, 89 D.A.R. 1943 
No. C002305 (Feb. 14, 1989). 
Private Citizen A warded Attorneys' 
Fees For Public Interest Advocacy 
In Response to City Action 
The Third District Court of Appeal 
has ruled that a private citizen is entitled 
to attorneys' fees in a public interest 
advocacy case, even where the advocate 
does not initiate the action. 
The City of Sacramento passed a 
resolution of intention to assess residents 
for the cost of certain school construc-
tion, under the authority of the Muni-
cipal Improvement Act of 1913. Property 
owner Drew protested, arguing that the 
construction was not authorized under 
the Act. The City filed an action to 
determine whether the assessment was 
authorized. Drew filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, which the trial court 
granted. Drew then moved for attor-
neys' fees under Code of Civil Proced-
ure section 1021.5. The court denied the 
motion. 
The Third District Court of Appeal, 
per Justice Blease, reversed, holding that, 
according to section 1021.5, a private 
citizen is entitled to attorneys' fees in a 
matter that (I) has brought significant 
benefit to the public; (2) requires private 
enforcement; and (3) demonstrates a fi-
nanc.iH! burden on the private citizen. 
Drew met all the statutory requirements 
and was therefore entitled to attorneys' 
fees. It was irrelevant that Drew did not 
commence the action, or that the court 
might have invalidated the bond act with-
out his intervention. 
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CALIFORNIA 
SUPERIOR COURTS 
People v. Safeway Stores, Inc., et al., 
No. 89576 (San Francisco 
Superior Court). 
Proposition 65 En/ orcement 
Suit To Be Heard 
The San Francisco Superior Court 
cleared the way for the first major en-
forcement lawsuit under Proposition 65, 
the Safe Drinking Water and Toxics 
Enforcement Act of 1986. 
The suit, brought by Attorney Gen-
eral John Van de Kamp, alleges that 
Safeway Stores and four other retailers 
failed to properly warn consumers of 
the dangers of cigar and pipe tobacco. 
Four environmental groups intervened 
in the suit. The toll-free service, which 
the store uses in an attempt to comply 
with Proposition 65, is also named. 
Twenty-five tobacco companies, origin-
ally named in the suit, agreed to put 
warning labels on their products, and 
settled in October 1988. (See CRLR 
Vol. 9, No. I (Winter 1989) p. 83 for 
background information.) 
Defendants' demurrer to the com-
plaint of the Attorney General was re-
jected on March 15. In the latest de-
velopment, San Francisco Superior Court 
Judge Stuart Pollak rejected defendants' 
demurrer to the complaint in interven-
tion of the environmental groups, clear-
ing the way for the lawsuit to proceed. 
A related case involving the toll-free 
service, Ingredient Communication 
Council, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, No. 504601 
(Sacramento Superior Court), was set 
for hearing on May 25. 
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